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UNDERGRADUATE NEWS
ROUND TABLE
INHERITANCE TAX
John J. Flavin 1
Although the law is commonly denominated an Inheritance
Tax Law, the tax is not limited to property received by inher-
itance. In addition to dispositions by will and intestacy, the
Act imposes a tax on any transfer or disposition of property
that partakes of the nature of a testamentary disposition.
Unlike the Federal Estate Tax Law, technically speaking, the
Illinois Act is not a tax upon the estate nor on the property,
but rather on the right to transfer or succeed to property by
will, intestacy or by any mode of disposition that is of a testa-
mentary nature. The state's right to the tax is predicated on
the theory that the right to transmit property is one of statutory
creation; that, but for the statute, the right would not exist, and
that the power that grants the privilege may deny it or impose
conditions upon that right.
The laws of descent are, likewise, creatures of the statute, and
may be altered or even withdrawn at the will of the law-making
body. In other words, if there was no Wills Act or Descent
Statute, all property would, upon the death of its owner, escheat
to the state. Consequently, the sovereign power of the state may
attach conditions to the privilege thus accorded.
The first Inheritance Tax Law of Illinois was enacted in 1895.
With but slight changes it remained in force until 1909, when it
was completely revised and the present law enacted. Compara-
tively few estates were affected by the 1895 law, and the revenue
derived by the state from that source was inconsequential.
Under the old law, property passing in trust for the benefit
of a surviving spouse or lineal descendants for life was exempt
to the extent of the value of the life estates in those cases where
the remainder was devised or bequeathed to collateral heirs.
Furthermore, the 1895 law did not provide for taxing contingent
interests in property inherited by will until the distributee or
* This was an address given before Round Table, the honor society
of Chicago-Kent College of Law. Because of its general Interest, It
was decided to publish this address at length.
1 Assistant Attorney General, State of Illinois.
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beneficiary was definitely ascertained. That necessitated the
postponement of the tax in all cases where the amount that the
ultimate beneficiary was to receive was not capable of being
ascertained, or where the person to receive the property was
not definitely known.
A good illustration on that point is the estate of the late Mar-
shall Field, the pioneer Chicago merchant, who died while the
1895 Inheritance Tax Law was in force. By the terms of his will
his property was conveyed in trust with directions to pay certain
portions of the income and principal of his estate to given named
persons, with the provision that if they died prior to the receipt
by them of their distributive share, the property was to pass to
others. The persons ultimately to receive this property could
not be ascertained at the time of his death. In fact, a great
many of them were not in being at that time, inasmuch as he
made provisions for the issue of his grandchildren. Under that
state of facts the tax on the bulk of his estate had to be post-
poned. The amount received by the state in the first instance
amounted to $112,167.38, while under the present law the tax
would have amounted to several million dollars.
In order to remedy that situation and to prevent a great deal
of property from escaping taxation, the Legislature in 1909
enacted the present Inheritance Tax Law. Under it the At-
torney General is designated as the supervising official over the
assessment and collection of inheritance taxes. All inheritance
tax proceedings are instituted in the county court, which court
is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over such matters. The At-
torney General designates Inheritance Tax Attorneys in the
various counties throughout the state to represent him in inher-
itance tax matters.
Approximately 90 per cent of the tax collected in Illinois is
derived from Cook County estates. For the two-year period of
1929 and 1930, the Cook County Inheritance Tax Office, located
in the City of Chicago, collected in excess of $23,000,000.
All property of Illinois residents passing by will or under the
intestate laws of this state is subject to inheritance taxation,
with the exception of real estate located outside of Illinois and
tangible personal property, such as household furniture, auto-
mobiles, jewelry, and the like, situated without the state. It is
a fiction of law that the situs of intangible personal property
is where the owner thereof is domiciled at the time of his death,
while the situs of real estate and tangible personal property is
-where it is actually located. Since the jurisdiction of the state is
limited to its boundary lines, property that has no situs in Illi-
nois is not subject to its laws, and for that reason real estate
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and tangible personal property located outside of Illinois is not
subject to inheritance taxation.
The personal property of non-resident decedents-other than
tangible personal property having an actual situs in this state-
is not taxable in Illinois if the decedent at the time of his death
was a resident of any state or territory of the United States
which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer or in-
heritance tax in respect to similar property of residents of this
state, or if the laws of the state of residence of the decedent at
the time of his death contained a reciprocal provision whereby
non-residents were exempted from taxation.
In addition to taxing property passing by will and intestacy
the Inheritance Tax Law taxes every conceivable transfer where
the property passes upon, as a result of, or is in any wise con-
nected with, the death of its owner. In that category are in-
eluded: (a) gifts made in contemplation of death; (b) trans-
fers intended to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or
after the donor's death; (c) real estate, stocks, bonds, and
moneys in bank, held in joint tenancy, that is in the joint names
of the decedent and others, with the right of survivorship; (d)
property which the decedent had the power to dispose by will
regardless of whom it belonged to.
In class (a) fall all gifts made in anticipation or contempla-
tion of one's death as the term is used in the statute. "Con-
templation of death" has been defined as not referring to the
general expectancy of all rational mortals that they will die
sometime. The courts have construed the term "contemplation
of death" to refer to an apprehension of death which arises from
some existing infirmity or impending peril. That provision of
the statute has given rise to considerable litigation, and while
no general rule can be laid down that will fit all cases, neverthe-
less, the age of a person making the gift, his physical condition,
any action contemplated to be taken by him with respect to his
health, and the length of time he survived the making of the gift,
are material elements considered in determining whether the
gift is or is not taxable.
The law does not aim to reach gifts from parents to children,
or for that matter to strangers, if they are not made in anticipa-
tion of death, whether outright or in the form of a trust. There
is no prohibition so far as the inheritance tax law is concerned
against persons making gifts, no matter how large, so long as it
is not done with a view of evading the tax. However, in order
to make a gift taxable, it is not necessary that the donor of the
gift be in a dying condition, or for that matter in poor health,
but it is conceivable that a person of extreme youth and vigor,
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in the prime of life and in good health might make a gift that
would fall within the purview of the taxing provisions of the
law. For example, if Colonel Lindbergh, immediately prior to
making the hop in his plane across the Atlantic, had made a gift
to his mother, notwithstanding the fact that he made the trip
safely and may live to ripe old age, that gift would ultimately
upon his death be subject to a tax owing to the great hazard
attached to the trip.
On the other hand, John D. Rockefeller, at the age of 90, who
has a physician constantly watching him, could give millions
away which would not be subject to taxation.
The kind of transfers that fall within class (b) have formed
the basis of extensive litigation in both the state and Federal
courts in recent years. That is largely due to the fact that per-
sons of wealth, in order to save their estates from the payment
of exorbitant inheritance taxes, frequently create living trusts
involving large sums of money. It is safe to say, that hundreds
of millions of dollars are thus tied up with the large banks'and
trust companies in this city. The general rule is that trusts are
free from taxation if they are set up with no strings attached
to them, if they are not made in contemplation of death, and no
right, title, interest or control over the trust property is reserved
by the donor. It is immaterial to whom the income is paid so
long as none of it is received by the creator of the trust. Such
trusts are beyond the reach of the law.
How that provision of the statute operates can best be under-
stood by an illustration or two. The late John G. Shedd. head
of Marshall Field & Company, who died October 26, 1926, created
several trusts during his lifetime involving about $15,000,000.
reserving no power or control of the property transferred and
divesting himself of all title and interest thereto and all right
ever to revest himself therewith. He was in good health at the
time of the transfer and continued actively in business up to his
death. The income from the trusts were paid by the trust com-
pany in accordance with the directions of the trust instrument to
his wife and children. None of the principal or income was
ever received by him. Upon his death he left a large estate
which passed by his will. None of the trusts were taxed, but
the property passing by his will produced a tax of $1,695,000.
Nettie Fowler McCormick, wife of the Harvester magnate,
and mother of Harold and Cyrus McCormick, died July 5, 1923,
leaving an estate of about $10,000,000. In 1918, about five years
before her death, she created a trust of International Harvester
stock, of the value of approximately $8,000,000. Under the
terms of the trust instrument the income was to be paid by the
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trustee for such charitable uses and purposes "as Mrs. McCor-
mick shall during her lifetime designate, with a further provision
that if in any year the net income from the property retained by
her shall be less than $250,000, she reserved the right to call on
the trust company to pay her out of the trust estate such an
amount as would, when added to the income from her individual
estate, equal the sum of $250,000. The trust instrument also pro-
vided that from and after her death the income should be dis-
tributed by the trustee to each of her three children, Cyrus H.
McCormick, Anita M. Blaine, and Harold F. McCormick, so long
as they shall severally live, and from and after the death of
either of said three beneficiaries his or her share of net income
should be paid over to their respective issue, with a further pro-
viso that if Mrs. McCormick survived her three children the trust
property should revert to her. She also reserved the right to
terminate the trust by an instrument in writing signed by her
and any one or more of her three children. During Mrs. Mc-
Cormick's lifetime her annual income from the property retained
by her and not transferred to the trustee exceeded $250,000.
The trustee paid the income derived from the trust property to
the charitable institutions that were designated by Mrs. McCor-
mick. Upon her death the state proceeded to tax the trust prop-
erty as well as the property passing by will, on the theory that
Mrs. McCormick did not part with all control of the trust prop-
erty; that until her death no one could say that the property
would not revert to her, and that, although she parted with the
title to the property, the beneficiaries had no right to receive any
part of the principal or income until after her death, and that
the transfer therefore took effect in possession or enjoyment in
the beneficiaries when she died and not before. The reservation
by her of the powers above enumerated and the right to receive
the income, if her income from other sources did not amount to
$250,000 per year, along with the other provision reserving the
power of revocation, formed the basis for the state's contention
of its taxability. The case was hotly contested by one of the
most prominent Chicago law firms, and upon appeal to the Su-
preme Court of Illinois, the state's right to the tax on the trust
property was upheld.2
Ante-nuptial agreements are likewise taxable as transfers tak-
ing effect in possession and enjoyment at death. The taxability
of ante-nuptial contracts was sustained by the Illinois Supreme
Court in the Marshall Field Estate. The late Marshall Field,
before entering into a second marriage, entered into a contract.
with his prospective wife, whereby he agreed that, in the event
she survived him, his estate was to pay her $1,000,000. Subse-
2 The People v. McCormick, 327 Il1. 547.
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quent to his death the widow questioned the state's right to
assess a tax on the $1,000,000 received by her. The matter was
taken to the State Supreme Court and the tax was upheld.3
Transfers that fall within class (c) are real estate, where the
title thereto is held in the joint names of the decedent and
others. Only one-half of the value of the property is taxable
to the surviving joint tenant upon the death of either of them.
The same is true of bank accounts, stocks, bonds, or other prop-
erty held in the joint names of two or more persons, and payable
to either or the survivor upon the death of one of such persons.
To the extent of one-half of the property, the law treats it as
though it had been bequeathed or devised to the survivor by will.
Very few transfers fall within class (d). That provision of
the statute is intended to cover those cases where there has been
no ultimate disposition of property, but the right is conferred
upon the decedent to dispose thereof by will. For example if
"A" by his will gives a life use in property to "B", with a
further provision that upon the death of "B" that property
should pass in such manner as "B" shall direct by his last will
and testament, and in default of such directions, then over to
someone else, although "B" had but a life estate in the property,
it would, nevertheless, be subject to taxation at his death under
the aforementioned provision of the statute, whether he exercised
the power to dispose of the same or failed to exercise the power.
In determining .the value of an estate for the purposes of
inheritance taxation, all property disposed of by will or passing
under the intestate laws of this state, as well as all property
passing under any other provision of the statute is included.
All valid debts due and owing from the decedent to others,
including funeral and burial expenses and costs of administra-
tion, are properly deductible. The amount due the Federal
Government for Federal Estate Tax is, likewise, deductible from
the gross estate. On the other hand, 80 per cent of the amount
paid for state inheritance taxes are, likewise, deductible from
the gross estate for Federal Estate Tax purposes.
To encourage bequests for charitable, educational, benevolent,
and philanthropic purposes, the law exempts from taxation such
bequests, provided they are to local institutions, that is, within
the State of Illinois. Bequests for educational, charitable, or
religious purposes in other states are taxable at the highest rate.
Many cases have come to the attention of the Cook County
Inheritance Tax Department where hundreds of thousands of
dollars in tax could have been saved by estates if, instead of be-
3 The People v. Estate of Field, 248 flI. 147.
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queathing the property to charities outside of Illinois, the tes-
tator had made a local institution his beneficiary.
The case of Edward Rector furnishes a striking example to
illustrate the point. Mr. Rector died August 1, 1925, and was
one of the prominent patent attorneys of this city. Practically
his entire estate, which was close to $2,000,000, was bequeathed
under his will to the DePauw University of Indiana, and a tax
of $464,517.65 was collected by the State of Illinois. Had that
property passed to Chicago-Kent College of Law, it would have
been exempt from inheritance taxation.
Another example is the Estate of Daniel F. McGuire, who
died April 2, 1923. The decedent was a Roman Catholic priest,
and had charge of the parish at Garfield Boulevard and Halsted
Street. He left an estate of upwards of $400,000. By his will
he gave all of his estate, with the exception of $16,000, to the
Chinese Mission Society of Nebraska. A tax of $89,626.18 was
assessed against his estate, whereas it would have been exempt
if the property had been given to an Illinois Roman Catholic
organization.
The question of residence often becomes important in connec-
tion with the assessment of inheritance taxes. In the Estate
of James Deering, a millionaire who died September 21, 1925,
the question of his residence played an important part in de-
termining the tax due the state. It developed during the hear-
ing, that several years before his death Mr. Deering got into a
controversy with the Cook County Board of Review about his
personal property taxes, and thereafter changed his legal resi-
dence to Florida, in order to avoid what he termed exorbitant
personal property tax. He continued to maintain a residence
on Lake Shore Drive and spent considerable time here. but
voted in Florida and gave Florida as his residence on all his
Income Tax returns. All that the State of Illinois was able to
levy a tax on in his estate was his real estate in Chicago, shares
of stock in Illinois corporations owned by him, and the con-
tents of his residence on Lake Shore Drive, including many valu-
able paintings. The tax received by the state in the James
Deering Estate amounted to $224.456.96, whereas it would in
all probability have been $2,000,000 if he was a resident of
Illinois.
The case of Norman Bridge might prove of interest. Dr.
Bridge, an elderly gentleman, formerly lived in Chicago. For
the later years of his life he moved to California and established
a residence there. It seems that the California law limits the
portion of one's estate that can be bequeathed to charity. When
Norman Bridge was informed of that provision in the California
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law, he concluded to re-establish his residence in Chicago, and
by his will, which was probated here, gave most of his estate,
which ran into several millions, to California universities. The
state collected a tax of $743,980.28. Had this decedent given
his property to Illinois universities it would have been exempt
from taxation.
The late James Patten, the wheat king, who left an estate of
about $20,000,000, gave by his will about $7,000,000 to Illinois
charitable, religious and educational institutions, none of which
was subject to a tax. The state, however, received $1,600,000
in inheritance tax on the property passing to his wife and
children.
One of the innovations in the 1909 Inheritance Tax Law was
the provision relating to the mode of taxing contingent inter-
ests. Instead of postponing the tax until the beneficiary re-
ceived the property, as under the 1895 law, the law now pro-
vides for the taxing of all property upon a person's death
whether the interests of the beneficiaries or distributees are
vested or contingent. As the law now stands, all property trans-
ferred or limited in trust or otherwise, where the rights or in-
terests of the transferees or beneficiaries are dependent on con-
ditions or contingencies whereby they may be wholly or in part
created, defeated, extended, or abridged, is taxable upon its
owner's death at the highest rate, which on the happening of
any condition or contingency, would be possible.
For example, a decedent with an estate of $1,000,000 leaves
a will creating a trust for the benefit of a son, with a proviso
that the income be paid to the son until he attains the age of
twenty-five years, at which time he is to receive the principal,
and in the event of his death prior to the period of distribution,
to the son's children, and if the son dies leaving him no children
surviving, then to such persons as would be the decedent's heirs-
at-law, at the time of such distribution. Under that state of
facts the law would assume that the son would die before the
period fixed for distributing the estate leaving no children him
surviving, and that the entire estate would pass to a nephew or
niece of the decedent, producing a tax of $150,000. The estate is
obliged under the law to pay that amount of tax immediately.
The law also provides that when the time for final distribution
arrives and the contingencies contemplated in the original assess-
ment of the tax do not occur, in other words, if the son in the
instant case survives the period of distribution and receives the
entire estate, a redistribution of the tax is made, the tax re-
assessed, and a refund is made by the state for the difference
between the amount of $150,000 originally paid, and $103,200
being the tax against a child, or the sum of $46,800, together
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with interest thereon at the rate of 3% per annum from the
date of such payment until the refund is made.
The law does not contain any provision for seggregating the
moneys paid to the State Treasurer on estates where the tax was
assessed at the highest rate as aforementioned. The tax so
collected is treated as revenue, whereas a large portion of it is
merely a deposit in the nature of security for the tax.
During the biennium of 1926-1928, close to $3,000,000 was
paid to the State Treasurer under the provision in the statute
for the taxing of contingent interests. Many millions of dollars
have been paid to the State Treasurer since the passage of the
Act in 1909 that will ultimately have to be refunded. The
money so received has been appropriated by the state and con-
sumed for various state purposes.
The procedure for obtaining a refund of inheritance taxes
after an order of re-assessment is entered in the county court,
is to present a claim therefor to the Court of Claims, and after
the claim is allowed by the Court of Claims, to obtain an ap-
propriation from the State Legislature for such payment.
This section of the law was further amended at the last session
of the Legislature, which amendment became effective July 1,
1929, so that now, instead of paying the tax assessed on con-
tingent interests in full immediately, the estate is permitted to
pay part of the tax, and deposit approved securities for the
balance to guarantee the ultimate payment of the tax. The in-
come derived from those secrities is paid to the annuitant or life
beneficiary. By this method, the life tenant is not deprived of
the income on the amount that may ultimately be refunded. In
this respect the present law eliminates the hardships that many
estates were confronted with by being obliged to sacrifice secur-
ities to pay the tax immediately.
FRATERNITY AVERAGES
In the battle waged for the scholarship cup Phi Delta Phi
emerged on top last semester, thus earning the right to retain
the cup during the first semester of the 1931-32 year. Some of
the other fraternities changed their standing markedly. Delta
Chi rose from sixth to second and Delta Theta Phi from seventh
to fourth. The averages of the fraternities for the second
semester of 1931, together with their standing the previous
semester are as follows: Phi Delta Phi, 1.775 (first) ; Delta
Chi, 1.695 (sixth); Nu Beta Epsilon, 1.430 (second); Delta
Theta Phi, 1.361 (seventh); Alpha Sigma Iota, 1.317 (fifth);
Phi Alpha Delta, 1.239 (third) ; Kappa Beta Pi, 1.047 (eighth).
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Sigma Delta Kappa, who had previously stood fourth, was
omitted from last semester's list for lack of a sufficient number
of members.
DEBATE
During the last two semesters the Chicago-Kent College of
Law completed a successful debating schedule, which included
the following opponents and subjects: Garrett Biblical Insti-
tute, which took the negative of the subject, "Resolved, that
Religious Broadcasting is detrimental to churches"; University
of Oklahoma, which took the negative of the subject, "Resolved,
that the U. S. should purchase and reforest sufficient farm land to
eliminate crop surpluses"; Northwestern University, which took
the negative of the subject, "Resolved, that intercollegiate
athletics as they are now conducted are detrimental to the stu-
dent and to the school"; University of Notre Dame, which took
the affirmative of the subject, "Resolved, that the several states
should enact legislation providing for compulsory insurance of
motor vehicles"; De Pauw University, which took the affirmative
of the subject, "Resolved, that capital punishment should be
abolished"; Lake Forest University, which took the affirmative of
the subject, "Resolved, that an educational requirement should
be attached to the right of suffrage"; University of Kansas, which
took the negative of the subject, "Resolved, that judges should
be elected by members of the bar"; Colgate University, which
took the affirmative of the subject, "Resolved, that all colleges
and universities should abolish the distinction between amateur-
ism and professionalism in all sports to which admission fees
are charged"; Creighton University, which took the negative of
the subject, "Resolved, that the several states should adopt a
system of compulsory unemployment insurance contributed to
by employes"; Marquette University, which took the affirmative
of the subject, "Resolved, that industry should be required by
law to observe a five day week labor schedule"; University of In-
diana, which took the negative of the subject, "Resolved, that
the Eighteenth Amendment should be so modified as to permit
government distribution of light wines and beer"; and Loyola
University, which took the affirmative of the subject, "Resolved,
that the jury should be abolished in criminal trials."
Early in the season the College arranged with radio station
W L S for the initial broadcast. Later a permanent arrangement
was made with W G N, the Chicago Tribune Station, which
proved advantageous in every respect. Our debate department
received fine co-operation from W G N, which has always spon-
sored an educational type of program, and we are pleased to
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announce that the ensuing season's schedule will be broadcast
over that station.
Since these broacasts are for the benefit of the public in gen-
eral, it has been sought to select topics of timely and wide-spread
interest, and not to limit them to highly technical and legal sub-
jects.
The following men were awarded debate keys at the June
commencement: Kenneth E. Becker, Robert N. Bishop, Wind-
ham Bonham, Richard G. Finn, Morton B. Hochberg, and Horace
G. Marshall. The latter was elected captain of next year's team.
The activities were well directed by Edmund W. Burke, and it
is hoped that he will be able to continue to direct next year's
activities.
